SUBSTANTIAL AND EFFECTIVE COMPLIANCE

Cleveland has been here before. In 2005 the Justice Department found that the city’s police had complied with an earlier agreement, and the agreement ended. A federal judge’s order adds: “The changes, however, did not last.”

This spring the City and the Justice Department asked a judge to end the 2015 decree. What stopped it was a judge who read the record, and the definition, before he ruled.

The signal

On February 19, 2026, the United States Department of Justice and the City of Cleveland filed a motion together. Not against each other. Together. They asked the court to terminate the consent decree that has governed Cleveland policing since 2015.

On May 8, Judge Solomon Oliver, Jr. said no.

He wrote seventy-four pages to say it. This is the finding: “In viewing the Decree as a whole, the court finds that the City has a ways to go before reaching Substantial and Effective Compliance with all of the material sections of the Agreement.”

The decree exists because the Justice Department spent nearly two years investigating and found “reasonable cause to believe that CDP engages in a pattern or practice of using unconstitutional force,” and that officers “use unnecessary and unreasonable force in violation of the Constitution at a significant rate.”

The order records what that meant on the ground. January 2011: officers using excessive force, “including kicks to the head, against an unarmed man who officers had already handcuffed and moved to the ground.” November 29, 2012: “more than 100 Cleveland police officers engaged in a high speed car chase, in violation of CDP policies, and fatally shot two unarmed civilians.”

Thirteen officers fired one hundred and thirty-seven shots at the car, with both occupants “suffering more than 20 gunshots wounds.”

The same order says the court “has repeatedly commended the City and CDP, especially in recent years, for its progress towards substantial and effective compliance.” In one section, the Monitor’s hiring assessment found that the department “has met or exceeded all requirements for Recruitment and Hiring,” and the court called it “commendable work.” The court found the progress short of the finish line, not absent.

The mirror

Read the finish line. The decree defines it at paragraph 401, and the judge quotes it:

“‘Substantial and Effective Compliance’ means that the City either has complied with all material requirements of this Agreement, or has achieved sustained and continuing improvement in constitutional policing, as demonstrated pursuant to this Agreement’s outcome measures.”

There is an or in the finish line.

The first branch is a destination. Comply with the requirements. You can audit that. You can be failed on it.

The second branch is a direction. Sustained and continuing improvement, shown through the decree’s outcome measures. A direction is harder to audit than a destination. It asks a judge to decide how much improving is enough.

It can be failed. The judge held that the record “does not include enough qualitative and quantitative data to demonstrate sustained and continuing improvement in constitutional policing.”

And whichever branch the City claims, the decree adds a clock. Compliance has to hold for one year on search and seizure and two consecutive years on everything else, “the first part of Paragraph 401,” in the judge’s words.

In 1955 the Supreme Court handed down a compliance standard built on a word. Ordered to desegregate the schools, it did not name a date. It sent the cases back to the district courts to admit children “with all deliberate speed,” and it gave school authorities “the primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving” the problems. The courts were to judge their good faith, and the burden of justifying delay sat on the defendants.

Deliberate. Speed. A word that means fast and a word that means take your time, bolted together, with no date attached.

The pattern

Both standards leave the final reading to a court. Brown II gave no date. Cleveland’s decree gave a count, and a judge still had to say whether the record met it.

The agreement is “enforceable only by the Parties.” When both of them ask to end it, no party in the case is there to argue the other side. The judge said so on the first page of his order: the motion was “filed jointly, meaning no party would be filing a brief in opposition.”

The two parties read the first branch together. They argued that the only material requirements were in three sections of the decree, and that those had been met. The judge was unpersuaded: “Nothing in the Agreement suggests that some requirements are material and some are not.”

The judge noticed something the parties did not raise: the City has not satisfied the sustainment period the decree requires. He calls it “a matter which the parties do not address.”

The order had made the same point earlier: “Without explanation, the parties omit any discussion or argument about this piece of the termination clause.”

The mechanism

A consent decree is a promise with a court behind it. The people who were beaten and shot are still exactly as beaten and shot as they were.

A remedy can fade without anyone acting in bad faith, so the decree counts time. The order calls that clock “a reasonable response to the City’s inability to fully implement or maintain changes recommended by the DOJ’s 2004 investigation over time.”

The finding is public, and so is the decree. The 137 shots are in the order, in a federal court’s own recitation of the facts, printed this year. So are the commendation of the City’s progress and the sentence that says it has “a ways to go.”

Correction

Corrected 2026-10-02. This casefile published on July 13, 2026. A reading of the whole casefile against its primaries found seven errors, named here rather than quietly repaired. Every quotation in it was accurate. Its subject stands: the Justice Department and Cleveland moved together to end the police consent decree, the decree defines its finish line with an “or,” the parties did not address the sustainment period, and Judge Solomon Oliver, Jr. denied the motion. The argument it built on that record went further than the record does, and it is corrected here.

It said nobody had to argue compliance. The casefile said: “The bar is not lowered. Nobody has to argue that Cleveland complied, and nobody had to argue that a district had desegregated. The bar is simply made of something that cannot be crossed, only approached, and the approach is graded by the people approaching.” The parties did argue it. The order: “They then appear to mostly rely on the material requirements basis in an effort to show that the City and CDP are in Substantial and Effective Compliance,” and “The court is unpersuaded.” The court and an independent Monitor assess compliance, and the court decides it; the City does not grade itself. It now reads: “The agreement is ‘enforceable only by the Parties.’ When both of them ask to end it, no party in the case is there to argue the other side. The judge said so on the first page of his order: the motion was ‘filed jointly, meaning no party would be filing a brief in opposition.’ The two parties read the first branch together. They argued that the only material requirements were in three sections of the decree, and that those had been met. The judge was unpersuaded: ‘Nothing in the Agreement suggests that some requirements are material and some are not.’”

It said the second branch could not be failed. The casefile said: “The second branch is a direction. Sustained and continuing improvement. You cannot finish improving. There is no day on which a city has improved enough, because improvement is a slope, and a slope has no end. A police department could be improving for a century and still be improving.” The decree ties that branch to outcome measures, with a schedule of assessments “at least annually, except where otherwise noted.” The judge applied it and found the record short. Paragraph 401 also sets a clock for either branch, compliance for one year on search and seizure and two consecutive years on the rest, and the judge held that the parties “have not satisfied the first part of Paragraph 401.” It now reads: “The second branch is a direction. Sustained and continuing improvement, shown through the decree’s outcome measures. A direction is harder to audit than a destination. It asks a judge to decide how much improving is enough. It can be failed. The judge held that the record ‘does not include enough qualitative and quantitative data to demonstrate sustained and continuing improvement in constitutional policing.’ And whichever branch the City claims, the decree adds a clock. Compliance has to hold for one year on search and seizure and two consecutive years on everything else, ‘the first part of Paragraph 401,’ in the judge’s words.” The hook said: “A finish line you can reach by improving is not a finish line. It is a direction.” It now reads: “There is an or in the finish line, and somebody has to read it.”

It said the standard hands the word to the party being watched. The casefile said: “Both standards do the same thing, and they do it the same way. They put the timing inside a word, and they hand the word to the party being watched.” In Cleveland the decree states its clock in years, and the court reads the word; in Brown II, “courts will have to consider whether the action of school authorities constitutes good faith implementation of the governing constitutional principles.” It now reads: “Both standards leave the final reading to a court. Brown II gave no date. Cleveland’s decree gave a count, and a judge still had to say whether the record met it.”

It said Brown II gave the pace to the districts. The casefile said: “In 1955 the Supreme Court handed down a compliance standard built the same way. Ordered to desegregate the schools, it did not name a date. It named a pace, and it gave the pace to the party that had to move: the districts were to admit children ‘with all deliberate speed.’” and “Deliberate. Speed. A word that means fast and a word that means take your time, bolted together and handed to the people who did not want to go.” Brown II remanded the cases “to the District Courts,” which “will retain jurisdiction,” and said “The burden rests upon the defendants to establish that such time is necessary in the public interest and is consistent with good faith compliance at the earliest practicable date.” It gave school authorities “the primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving these problems,” with the courts judging their good faith. It now reads: “In 1955 the Supreme Court handed down a compliance standard built on a word. Ordered to desegregate the schools, it did not name a date. It sent the cases back to the district courts to admit children ‘with all deliberate speed,’ and it gave school authorities ‘the primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving’ the problems. The courts were to judge their good faith, and the burden of justifying delay sat on the defendants.” and “Deliberate. Speed. A word that means fast and a word that means take your time, bolted together, with no date attached.”

It gave the ruling one reason. The casefile opened: “You already know how oversight ends. Not with a ruling that it worked. With everybody agreeing they are tired.” and “In Cleveland it almost ended that way this spring, and the only reason it did not is that one man read the paperwork.” The order describes the motion as moving to terminate under paragraph 401 and Rule 60(b)(5), or in the alternative (b)(4), because the City and its police “have achieved substantial compliance with the Agreement and a durable remedy.” The court “expressed extreme surprise at the Motion,” and the Cleveland Community Police Commission “appeared surprised by it too.” The order rests on the Monitor’s reports and compliance assessments, on the meaning of “material requirements,” on the outcome measures, on the sustainment period, and on a separate Rule 60(b)(5) analysis. The order also records the earlier agreement: in 2005 the Department “found the Division had complied,” the agreement was terminated, and “The changes, however, did not last.” It now reads: “Cleveland has been here before. In 2005 the Justice Department found that the city’s police had complied with an earlier agreement, and the agreement ended. A federal judge’s order adds: ‘The changes, however, did not last.’” and “This spring the City and the Justice Department asked a judge to end the 2015 decree. What stopped it was a judge who read the record, and the definition, before he ruled.”

It left out the City’s progress and put fatigue in its place. The casefile set the 2012 shooting beside the 2026 motion with nothing between them, and said: “The plaintiff and the defendant, standing at the same table, asking to be excused.” and “A consent decree is a promise with a court behind it. The court is the only thing in the arrangement that is not tired. Cities get tired. Administrations change. The lawyers who wrote the finding retire. The people who were beaten and shot are still exactly as beaten and shot as they were, but the institution around the case ages out from under them, and there arrives a morning when everyone still in the room would rather be finished.” The order says the court “has repeatedly commended the City and CDP, especially in recent years, for its progress towards substantial and effective compliance.” The order describes the parties’ grounds as the changes the City has made and the Monitor’s data on them, and as an argument under Rule 60(b)(5); the City’s officials assert in affidavits that the decree is “inhibiting progress,” and the court wrote that “declarations without concrete examples are self-serving.” The order does not use the word fatigue. It said of the sustainment period: “The Department of Justice did not address it. The City did not address it. The two people whose job it was to hold that line both walked past it, in a document they signed together.” The order says that “the parties omit any discussion or argument” about it. It closed that section: “Everyone who signed that motion could read it.” The order it pointed to was written after the motion. The progress sentences are added, the “excused” line and the closing sentence are cut, and the rest now reads: “A consent decree is a promise with a court behind it. The people who were beaten and shot are still exactly as beaten and shot as they were.” and “The order had made the same point earlier: ‘Without explanation, the parties omit any discussion or argument about this piece of the termination clause.’” “Cycles repeat because we refuse to learn, or because the people in power remove the record to keep the cycle running across generations. Cleveland is the first kind. Nothing was removed.” is cut; the order does not say the City refuses to learn, and the order “applauds the City and CDP for learning from the Monitor’s 2022 assessment” of its hiring. The paragraph now ends: “printed this year. So are the commendation of the City’s progress and the sentence that says it has ‘a ways to go.’” The subtitle said he read the finish line “more carefully than either of them did.” It now reads: “Cleveland and the Justice Department asked a judge to end the police consent decree together. He read the finish line, and the record behind it, and said no.”

It treated the next challenge as hypothetical. The box at the end said: “The decree held this time. It held because a judge read a definition and applied it, which is the whole job and is not nothing.” and “But he is one man, and the standard he was reading still has an or in it. The next motion will be filed by somebody, someday, and it will be filed against the same sentence.” On July 7, 2026, the Justice Department filed a notice of appeal to the Sixth Circuit (No. 26-3617). This casefile published on July 13. On August 19 that court directed the appointment of pro bono counsel to defend the district court’s order. As of the CourtListener copy of the docket, last updated September 18, 2026, no decision had been entered. It now reads: “The decree held in the district court. It held because a judge read the definition and the record against the motion and found the motion short. That is the whole job, and it is not nothing.” and “On July 7 the Justice Department filed a notice of appeal to the Sixth Circuit. This casefile first published on July 13. On August 19 the appeals court, in a case ‘in which no adverse party will appear,’ directed the appointment of counsel ‘to defend the district court’s order.’ As of the public copy of the docket, last updated September 18, 2026, no decision had been entered.”

Smaller changes made at the same time:

• “That is not corruption. That is the ordinary weight of time, and the word compliance is built to receive it. A standard with a slope in it can absorb any amount of fatigue and still look like a standard. It is a bar that reads as rigorous and behaves as patient.” now reads “A remedy can fade without anyone acting in bad faith, so the decree counts time. The order calls that clock ‘a reasonable response to the City’s inability to fully implement or maintain changes recommended by the DOJ’s 2004 investigation over time.’”; the slope it described is corrected above.
• “shots into the car” now reads “shots at the car”; the order says “fired 137 shots at the car.” “Both people inside were hit more than twenty times” now quotes the order: both occupants “suffering more than 20 gunshots wounds.”
• Several sentences in the body were tightened for flow, with no change to what they claim.
• The source record for Brown II said “the pace is set by the party being ordered to move,” and the record for the order called the second branch “a direction, not a destination.” Both are corrected to match. Two records are added: the 2015 decree itself, and the Sixth Circuit’s order of August 19, 2026.

Sources: United States v. City of Cleveland, No. 1:15-cv-01046 (N.D. Ohio), Order, ECF No. 708 (May 8, 2026); Settlement Agreement, ECF No. 7-1 (June 12, 2015), paragraphs 368, 369, 401 and 403; United States v. City of Cleveland, No. 26-3617 (6th Cir.), Order, Doc. 22 (August 19, 2026), and docket; Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955). Read on October 2, 2026.